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Pennsylvania State University 
ABSTRACT 
Standard theory of differential games focuses the study on two-person 
zero-sum games, and treat N-person games separately and differently. In this 
paper we present a new equivalent formulation of the Nash equilibrium strategy 
for N-person differential games. Our contributions are the following: 
1) Our min-max formulation unifies the study of two-person zero-sum with that 
of the general N-person non zero-sum games. Indeed, it opens a new avenue 
of systematic research for differential games. 
2) We are successful in applying the finite element method to compute 
solutions of linear-quadratic N-person games. We have also established 
numerical error estimates. Our calculations, which are based upon the 
dual formulation, are very efficient. 
3) He are able to establish global existence and uniqueness of solutions of 
the Riccati equation in our form, which is important in synthesis. This, 
to our knowledge, has not been done elsewhere by any other researchers. 
This paper's particular emphasis is on the duality approach, which is 
motivated by computational needs and is done by introducing N + 1 Language 
multipliers: one for each player and one "joint multiplier" for all 
players. For N-person linear quadratic games, we show that under suitable 
conditions the primal min-max problem is equivalent to its dual min-max 
problem, which is actually a saddle point and is then computed by finite 
elements. Numerical examples are presented in the last section. 
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1 §o. Introduction 
Consider an N-person differential game with linear dynamics 
(0.1) 
{ 
d~ x(t) = 
x(O) = Xo E Rn , 
where is the control variable under the command 
of the i-th player Pi; A, Bi are proper n x n, n x mi matrix valued 
functions, f E L2 = L2(0,T;Rn) is the inhomogeneous term and x is the state 
n 
variable. 
An N-tuple of controls u = 
loop strategy. Associated with each player Pi 
N 
11 
i=l 
U. 
~ 
is called an open-
is a cost functional J.(x,u) 
~ 
(1 ~ i ~ N) incurred in a game due to a strategy u and the outcome x of 
(0.1) that is generated by u. The case when J i is quadratic of the form (3.1) 
in ~3 will be of particular interest to us. 
,.. (" " Each player Pi wishes to minimize his cost J i • We say that u = ul ,u2 , ... , 
~) forms an (optimal) equilibrium strategy if 
(0.2) l~i~N, 
for all vi E Ui • Such a strategy allows all players to play individual optimal 
strategies simultaneously. Therefore the questions of its existence, uniqueness, 
solutions and computations constitute the most important study in the theory of 
N-person differential games. 
2 
Standard theory of differential games (e.g. [6],[8]) focus the study on 
two-person zero-sum games, and treat N-person games separately and differently. 
For two person zero-sum games, the concept of an equilibrium strategy coincides 
with that of a saddle point. One then proceeds to use either the Pontryagin 
(Friedman, Issacs) minimaximum principle or the Bellman dynamic programm~ng to 
derive necessary conditions for equilibrium. To compute optimal strategies, one 
must either solve (usually) a two-point boundary value problem of ODEs or a PDE 
(the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equation). 
For N-person games, the pioneering work was done by Lukes and Russell [9J. 
Their basic point of view, which was inherited in most of the subsequent papers 
on this subject, actually was to regard N-person differential games as a more 
complex N-simultaneous optimization problem. From (0.2), they regard u. as the 
~ 
optimal control for the i-th player when other players are using respective 
strategies A A ~ A ul,···,ui_l,ui+l'···UN· So they proceeded to use the primal, dual, 
or feedback synthesis methods to solve 
subject to 
x = Ax + B.u. + B.v. + f J J ~ ~ 
for players i = 1,2, .•. ,N. So u. can be obtained by differentiating J. with 
~ ~ 
respect to v., while holding other players' individual optimal strategies fixed. 
~ 
This yields N simultaneous equations for \ll'."'uN, The solvability of these 
equations gives N necessary conditions in general. Even if these N equations 
3 
can be solved simultaneously, it is not certain (except perhaps in the linear-
quadratic case, wherein the invertibility of certain operators is a sufficient 
condition) that the derived controls Ql, ..• ,uN indeed form an equilibrium 
strategy, since 
,. ,. 
ul, ••• ,uN mutually interfere through the system dynamics. As 
a matter of fact, the game-theoretic nature of the problem seems to be lost in 
this approach. 
In this paper, we present a new approach to N-person games - we show that 
an N-person game can also be formulated into a min-max point problem (§1). 
This formulation gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence 
of equilibrium strategies. This min-max problem is primal. Later on, we will 
see that under certain conditions this min-max problem is actually a saddle 
point problem. In this sense, we see that our work has unified the theory of 
two-person zero-sum games with the theory of N-person non zero-sum games. 
In ~2, we formulate the dual of the primal problem, which becomes a max-min 
-- . --
problem. In the dual formulation, system dynamical equations like (0.1) are 
eliminated, thus the new max-min problems is unconstrained. The dual problem is 
formulated in terms of N+l Lagrange multipliers Pi(O ~ i ~ N): one multiplier 
Pi for each player Pi (1 ~ i ~ N) and one "joint multiplier" Po for all 
players. 
Beginning from §3, we specialize to the quadratic cost case. We formally 
synthesize the closed-loop equilibrium strategy and derive the (new) Riccati 
equation (3.13) which is different from those in other formulations (see e.g. 
[6], [9]). 
~4 deals with the variational formulation of the dual problem. Here we 
make several assumptions which ensure the tractability of the dual problem. Then 
the "primal-dual equivalance theorem" is established. The important existence 
and uniqueness of equilibrium strategy is proved in Theorem 4.7. 
4 
In §S, we establish the global existence and un~queness of the solution of 
the Riccati equation. 
§6 studies finite element approximations. Our work here is motivated by 
similar work on the Ritz-Trefftz and the finite element methods for optimal 
controls (see, e.g. [2],[10]). To our knowledge, this is the first time the 
finite element method is applied to differential games. 
Numerical results are given in the last ~ 7. 
In our sequel, Part II [3], we will again use the basic formulation in §1, 
but combine it with the penalty and the finite element methods, and compare our 
numerical results from these different approaches. 
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§l. Equilibrium Strategy as Min-Max Point 
We first foroulate a sufficient condition which states that an equilibrium 
strategy can be found as a min-rnax point. In a two-person zero-sum 
game, such a saddle pOint formulation is given a priori. However, for an 
N-person game our formulation seems to be completely new; it forms the basis 
for all of our future discussions. 
For each u E U, one can solve x from (0.1) and determine Ji(x,u)(l ~ i ~ N). 
Thus each Ji(x,u) is a functional on (ul' ••• '~)' so we define 
(1.1) 
(1. 2) F(u,v) -
* Lemma 1.1 If u satisfies 
* (1. 3) sup F(u ,v) ::: 0, 
vEU 
* * then u is an equilibrium strategy. Conversely, if u is an equilibrium 
strategy, then (1.3) holds. 
Proof: Assume that (1.3) holds. Choose 
where Vi E Ui is arbitrary. Then 
(1.4) * i * F(u ,v ) ~ sup F(u ,v) ~ o. 
vEU 
But 
which is less than or equal to 0 by (1.4). So (0.2) is satisfied; 
equilibrium strategy. 
* Conversely, if u 
(1.5) 
is an equilibrium strategy, then 
* 
6 
* u is an 
Summing (1.5) from 1 through N, we get F(u ,v) ::: 0, 'r/v E U. Hence (1.3) 
holds. o 
Theorem 1. 2 If 
(1. 6) 
or 
(1. 6') 
inf sup F(u,v) < 0 
uEU vEU 
min 
uEU 
sup F(u,v) ::: 0 
vEU 
is satisfied, then the differential game has at least one equilibrium strategy. 
Proof: Under (1.6), we have at least one u E U such that sup F(~,v) ::: 0 
'r/v E U. By Lemma 1.1, u is an equilibrium strategy. Same conclusion holds 
for (1.6'). o 
Remark 1.3 
therefore 
Thus (1.6) 
(1.6") 
In the above proof, we see that if we choose 
0 = F(li,v) < sup F(li,v) ~ 0, 
v 
sup F(li,v) = O. We see that it is impossible 
v 
is ruled out. An eguilibrium strate6l exists 
min sup F(u,v) = O. 
uEU vEU 
A simple corollary is that if (li,v) solves 
(1. 7) F(u,v) = min 
uEU 
max F(u,v) = 0, 
vEU 
then u is an equilibrium strategy. 0 
7 
v = u, then 
to have sup F(u,v) 
v 
if and onll if 
Remark 1.4 In the discussion above, nowhere have we used the linear 
dynamics of (0.1). Therefore Theroem 1.2 and Remark 1.3 are valid under 
the general setting of [6]. 
Therefore, the question of finding an equilibrium strategy is reduced to 
solving the min-max problem (1. 7) or (1. 6"). 
From now on, we signify the Sobolev space 
k 
{O,T] ~Rn I lIyl/ k - L: 
H j=O 
n 
We define 
-< O. 
J(x,u;X,v) 
where 1 N [Hl]N X = (x , ••. , x ) E 
n 
(1. 8) 
and each i x 
8 
is the solution of 
If the given differential game has at least one equilibrium strategy, then 
we can cons~der solving 
(1.9) 
where 
(1.10) 
(1.11) 
and 
(1.12) 
min max J(x,u;X,v), 
x,u X,v 
(DE)=O [DE]=O 
(DE) 
N 
= x - Ax - Z B.u. - f, 
j=l J J 
x E Hl subject to 
n' 
N 
[DE} = L: 
i=l 
X(O) 1 N = (x (O), ... ,x (0» = 
x(O) = xO' 
(DE). 
~ 
.i 
_ x 
i N 
A:E. - Z Bju. j=l J 
i E Hl 
- Bivi - f, x n' subject to 
j;H 
9 
Suppose that the cost functional is given as 
In our framework, we can define the Hamiltonian as 
(1.13) H(t,x,u,X,v,qo,q) -
N 
+ <qO(t),A(t)x(t) + Z Bi(t)u.(t) + f(t» 
i=l J. 
N • N 
J. 
+ ;:; <q.(t),A(t)x (t) + ~ B.(t)u.(t) +B.(t)v.(t) +f(t», 
i=1 J. j=l J J J. J. 
jjCi 
where q = (ql,q2, ••• ,qN). The Pontryagin minimaximum principle can be stated 
as follows: Assume that (u,v) is a min-max point for min max F(u,v) subject to 
u v 
'" (DE) = 0, [DE] = 0; let x,X,qo,q satisfy the canonical equations 
(1.14) x(O) = Xo • 
(1.15) 1 :: i :: N 
J 
(1.16) a ( '" '" "''' .... ) I = - ax H t,x,u,X,v,qo,q .... 
x=x 
10 
(1.17) = 0 ( A A A A A)I 
- ~ H t,x,U,X,v,qo,q A 
ax X=X 
Then, we have, necessarily, the Hamiltonian at a m1n-max point for all time 
t E (O,T): 
(1.18) = m1n max H(t,x,u,X,v,qo,q) 
(x,u) (X,v) 
Alternatively, we can also use the dynamic programming approach. Define 
"the value of the game" V("'t",.;,S) by 
(1.19) 
subject to 
N 
V("'t",s,S) _ min max L {JT [hi(t,x(t),ul(t), ••• ,~(t»-hi(t,xi(t),ul(t), 
u v i=l "'t" 
•.. ,u1_l (t) ,vi (t) ,ui +l (t), ... ,~(t» ]dt 
N 
x(t) = A(t)x(t) + L B.(t)u.(t) + f(t), 
i=l 1 l. 
N 
+ L B.(t)u. (t) +Bi(t)v.(t) +f(t), 
j =1 J J .l 
j#i 1 :: i :: N, 
on with 1 N n N 3 - (~ , ••• ,~ ) E [R ] • 
If (1.19) is well-defined, under suitable assumptions (cf. [6J, §4), we have 
the Issacs equation 
(1. 20) 
N a~V(~,~.~) + miR m
i 
uE IT R 
i=l 
m~ {<'J a-: V(~,.; ,2) ,A('t")~ + l: B. ('t")u. + f(~» 
N Rmi '" i=l ~ ~ Rn 
v E IT 
i=1 
N 
+ ~ <V • V('t",s,8), 
i=l .;~ 
i N 
A('t") s + ~ B. ('t") u j j=l J 
j#i 
N i i 
+ ~ [hi ('t",~,u) - h. (~,~ ,v )] = 0, 
i=l ~ 
+ Bi(~)vi + f(~» 
Rn 
with the terminal conditon 
(1.21) 
N 
V(T,s,2) = Z [gi(s) - gi(~i)]. 
i=1 
This leads further to the Be11man-Hami1ton-Jacobi equation 
(1. 22) 
N i N 
+ Z <V iV(t,x,X),A(t)x + ~ B.(t)ujet,x,x,v V,VXV) + 
i=1 x j=l J x 
j#i 
N i ~i 
+ Z [h.(t,x,u(t,x,X, iV, v..XV» - h.(t.x ,v (t,x,X, 'iJ V, 'iTXV) 1 = 0, . 1 ~ x ~ X ~= 
where U(t,Xl,X,qO,q) and v(t,x,X,qo,q) are "feedback controls" for u and v 
satisfying 
for 
min max H(t,x,u,x,v,qo,q) = 
mi mi 
uEl1R vEI"IR 
n 
t E [O,T], x E R , 
min 
m. 
vEITR ~ 
12 
max H(t,x,u,X,v,qo,q) 
mi 
uE!"!R 
Comparing (1.21), (1.22) with [6] p. 293, (8.2.5), (8.2.6), for example, we 
see that our B-H-J equation is a single equation (in contrast with a system of N 
equations), but of 1 + n(N + 1) independent variables (in contrast with 1 + n 
variables). 
Throughout the above paragraphs, that the min-max point (i,~;X,v) corresponds 
to an equilibrium strategy depends on whether the value of (1.9) is a or not. 
This important issue will be addressed in our future papers. For linear quadratic 
games, a good answer can be found in (4.27) of Theorem 4.7. 
~2. Duality Theory 
We consider the following inf-sup problem 
(P) inf sup {J(x,u;X,v) I J as in (1. 8) , (x,u) E Hl x U subject to (DE) = 
X,v n x,u 
(X,v) E [Hl]N 
n 
x U subject to [DE] = a as in 
(1.10) , (loll)} • 
This constitutes the primal problem. Associated with (P) is the dual problem 
(D) sup inf L (PO,p) , 
EL2 E[L2]N Po n P n 
0, 
with the Lagrangian 
(2.1) 
- inf sup L(PO'p;x,u;X,v) 
x,u X,v 
N 
J(x,u;X,v) + <PO,x - Ax - Z B.u. 
j=l J J 
N .i i 
+ Z <p. ,x - Ax 
i=l ~ 
N 
- ~ Bju. - Bivi -j=l J 
jr:i 
for x,X satisfying x(O) = xo ' X(O) = Xo = (xO'··· ,xO). 
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From now on we say that (x,u) or (X,v) is feasible if 1 (x, u) E H x U 
n 
satisfies (1.10) and (X,v) E [Hl]N x U satisfies (1.12). 
n Similarly, (PO,p) 
We are now in a position to state the fundamental theorem in this paper. 
Theorem 2.1 (Duality Theorem) Assume that J(x,u;X,v) is convex 1n (x,u) and 
concave in (X,v), for all (x,u) and (X,v) satisfying differential constraints, 
continuous in 
(AO) inf 
(x, u) 
feasible 
Then there exists 
sup 
(X,v) 
feasible 
u and 
J(x,u;X,v) _ C < ~ 
which is a max-m1n point for (D) with L(PO'p) 
Furthermore, if (x,u;X,v) is a min-max point for (p), then 
(2.2) 
" = c. 
min min 
E[L2]N (x,u) 
p n x(O)=~ 
max 
(X,v) 
X(O)=XO 
= min 
(x,u) 
feasible 
max J(x,u:X,v) 
~.,re proceed to 
For any given 
(X,v) 
feasible 
prove the theorem. 
(x,u) E HI x U, let 
n 
(2.3) y(x,u) - sup J(x,u;X,v), 
(X,v) 
feasible 
and also define 
14 
L(pO'p;x,u;X,v) 
(2.4) 
N 
cp(x,u,p) = sup {J(x,u;X,v) + .Z <Pi,(DE)i> I X E [H!]N,v E U, X(O) = XOJ 
X,v ~=l 
By (AO), we know that there exists at least one feasible (x,u) such that 
(2.5) sup J(x,u;X,v) = \jr(x,u) < +"". 
(X,v) 
feasible 
From now on we need only study \jr(x,u) and cp(x,u,p) for those (x,u) satisfying 
(2.5). 
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Lemma 2.2 (Weak Duality) For any (x,u) satisfying (2.5), the functional 
¢(x,u,p) defined above is convex in p and 
(2.6) inf ¢(x,u,p) ~ t(x,u) 
PE[L~]N 
holds. 
Proof: Simple verification. o 
Lemma 2.4 (Strong Duality) Assume that J(x,u;X,v) is concave in (X,v) for 
all (X,v) E [H; ]N x u, X(O) = XO. Then for any (x,u) E H~ x u, x(O) = xO' 
~ve have 
(2.7) inf ¢(x,u,p) = t(x,u). 
PE[L~]N 
Proof: If t(x,u) = + 00, then (2.7) holds trivially by Lemma 2.2. So we assume 
that (2.5) holds. The arguments in [7, p. 846-847] immediately apply. We define 
two convex sets 
Y _ {(a,O) E R x [L~]N I a ~ t(x,u)} 
Z - ((a,b) E R x [L~]N I a :: J(x,u;X,v), b = (bl ,··· ,bN) , 
bi = xi - Axi - Bivi - Z B.u. - f, j#i J J 
i 
x (0) = xO' i = 1, ... ,N.) 
16 
Then it is easily checked that y n (interior of Z) = ¢ since when b 
a < J(x,u;X,v) S sup J(x,u;X,v) 
(X,v) 
feasible 
for any (a,O) E[interior of Z1which is obviously nonempty. So by the 
separation theorem (see, e.g. [l~, p. 38, Theorem 3.3.3), Y and Z can be 
d kl i R [LZ ] N '. separate wea y n x n 
(2.8 ) 
for some (r, -q) E R x [L2]N. A· . [7] h 0 rgu1ng as 1n , we see t at r > • 
n So r can 
be normalized to 1. Using a l = J(x,u;X,v) and aZ = y(x,u) in (2.8), we get 
:herefore 
thus 
N 
J(x,u;X,v) + Z <q.,b.> ~ t(x,u). 
111 
¢(x,u,~) S t(x,u); 
inf ¢(x,u,p) S ¢(x,u,~) S t(x,u). 
pE[L~]N 
Combining the above with (2.6), we conclude (2.7). o 
Remark 2.5 It is well understood in duality theory that the "hyperplane" 
separating Y and Z will define and attain the optimal dual multipliers 
(when -V(x,u) < 00). o 
17 
The arguments for the following lemma are the same as those for Lemmas 
2.3 and 2.4, the proofs are therefore omitted. 
Lemma 2.6 Assume that J(x,u;X,v) is concave with respect to (X,v) and 
convex ~-1ith respect to (x, u) 
X(O) = XO' x(O) = xO' We have 
(2.9) 
sup 
2 
POELn 
inf 
1 (x,u) H xU 
n 
x(O)=xO 
[~(x,u) + <Po' (DE»] = inf 
(x,u) 
feasible 
(x,u) E HI x U, 
n 
[~(x, u)] • o 
Remark 2.7 In (2.4), we introduce N Lagrange multipliers Pi' one for each 
player. In (2.9), we introduce the joint multiplier Po co~~only shared by 
all players. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1 From Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7, we conclude that 
(P) = inf sup {J(x,u;X,v) I (x,u) and (X ,v) are feasible} 
x,u X,u 
= inf 
(x, u) 
feasible 
sup J(x,u;X,v)] 
(X,v) 
= 
feasible 
inf t(x, u) 
(x,u) 
feasible 
inf 
1 (x,u) EH xU 
n 
x(O)=xO 
[~(x,u) + <PO~DE»] (by Lemma 2.6) 
o 
18 
= sup ~n£ ~n£ N sup [J(x,u;X,v) + L: <p. ,(DE) .> + 2 I pE[L2]N PO ELn (x, u) EH xu (X, v) E [HI]NxU i=l ~ ~ n n n 
x(O)=xO X(O)=Xa 
+ <PO' (DE»] (by Lemma 2.4) 
= L(p,q) = (D), (by Remark 2.5). 
Hence if (x,~;X,v) is feasible and solves (P) and if (PO'p) is feasible 
and solves (D), we have 
C J(~,~;X,v) = min max J(x,u;X,v) 
(x, u) (X, v) 
feasible feas~ble 
So the proof is complete. o 
There are still improvements on Theorem 2.1 that could be made, but that 
would make Theorem 2.1 unduly too general and lengthy, so we choose not to do 
them here. 
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§3. Linear Quadratic Problems and Synthesis 
From now on throughout the rest of the paper, we consider the linear 
quadratic problem whose cost functionals are given by 
(3.1) + <Mi (t)u. (t) ,u. (t» ]dt, 
1. 1. mi R 
i = 1, ••• ,N, (x,u) feasible, 
where we assume that C. (t) 
1. 
and Mi(t) are matrix-valued functions of 
appropriate sizes and smoothness, zi(t) is a vector-valued function. 
Furthermore, induces a linear operator which is 
positive definite: 
(3.2) <Miu. ,U.> 
1. 1. 2 
for some Vo > O. 
L 
mi 
1 :: i :: N, 
The main objective of this section is to give a formal derivation of the 
adjoint equations and the Riccati equation from the dual formulation. Later on 
in §4 we will see that under certain sufficient conditions these procedures can 
be justified by Theorems 2.1 and 4.6. 
We use the definition of J(x,u;X,v) as in (1.8). For any feasible (PO,p), 
the Lagrangian L is 
N 
(3.3) L(pO'p;x,u;X,v) = J(x,u;X,v) + <PO' (DE» + Z <p., (DE) i> 
2 i=l 1. L2 
Ln n 
20 
= 
N 
~ Biui - f> i=l L2 
N i i 
+ ~ <Pi'x - Ax - ~ 
i=l jtl 
B.u. - B v - f > 
J J i i L2 
n 
We first study max L(pO'p;x,u;X,v). Assume that for givenpo'p,x,u, 
(X,v) 
X(O)=XO 
.-
the maximum is attained at (X,v). By a simple variational analysis on 
we have, necessarily, 
(3.4) 
~ . . "''',,~ ~ 
-<c. (C.x -z.) ,y > 
~ ~ ~ 2 
Ln 
for all i E Hl Y n' I ::: ~ ::: N. 
From variational analysis, we also have 
(3.5) 0, 
and 
Hence 
i Ay > 
L2 
n 
= 0; 
* = 0 (C adjoint of 
1 ::: i ::: N. 
i 
x , 
C) , 
n 
(3.6) 
Similar variational analysis on vi gives 
or, 
(3.7) 
- <MiV. ,w.> 
~ ~ 2 
L 
mi 
,. -1 * 
v. = -M. BiP., ~ ~ ~ 1 :: i :: N. 
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L( ,. ,. We now consider min PO,p;x,u;X,v). Assume that the minimum is 
(x, u) 
x(O)=xO 
attained at (x,u). By the same reasoning as above, we get 
(3.8) Po E H1 n' 
* 
. 
Po = -A P 0 (3.9) 
(3.10) 
POeT) = 0, 
+ 
N 
* Z c. (c .x-z.) 
~ ~ ~, i=l 
N 
+ Z 
j=l 
j;ti 
-1 * PJ.) = M. B.(PO+p -p.), ~ ~ s ~ 
N 
Z p .• 
j=l J 
Let L(PO'P) be as defined in §2. If the problem max min L(PO'p) attains its 
PO p 
max-min at and satisfy (3.8), (3.9) and (3.5), (3.6). 
Therefore we obtain x,v,x,u,PO'P as the solution to the following two point 
boundary value problem: 
Theorem 3.1 Let ~,v,x,u'Po and p satisfy 
= 
= 
max 
Po 
min L (PO,p ;i, ~;X, v) 
p 
max min min max 
Po p x,u X,u 
x(O)=xO X(O)=Xa 
= J(x,u;X,v) 
= min max J(x,u;X,v). 
x,u X,v 
x(O)=xO X(O)=XO 
L(PO'p;x,u;X,v) 
" ~ ,,1 "N Then X,A = (x , ••• ,x ), are coupled through: 
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... 
x A a a 
Al a x A a 
... N a a A x 
d N 
* (3.11) dt A Z C.C. a a Pa i=l J. J. 
= 
* A 
-C1C1 a PI a 
A . 
* PN a a -~C r N 
a I 
and u,v satisfy 
A -1 *(A +'" "') u. = M. B. Pa Ps - p. ]. ].]. ]. , 
A -1 * ... 
vi = -M. B.p., J. J. J. 
where in (3.11), 
(3.12) N -1 * S - Z B.M. B. j=l J J J, 
-L* Si:; Z B.M.ll. 
j;H J J J, 
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S s ' .. , S X r f 1 N I f Sl Sll' .. SIN ... 1 x 
SN SNl" . 'SmT 
AN f x 
* 
N * 
-A o ... a A z CiZi Pa i=l 
* + * a -A A C1Z1 PI 
. . 
. 
.. 
* 
* 
AN CNZN a -A P 
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Decoupling can be achieved by assuming the feedback affine relation 
(3.13) 
Let us write 
A O. 0 
A -
O. A 
'0 
o 0 A 
[n x (N + 1)] x [n x ( N + 1) ] 
N 
* L: C.C. O. 0 
i=l l. l. 
* a: 
- O. -C1C1 0 
. * 0 0 
-CNCN 
* 
-A. o . 0 
-1-.,* = . * . O. ·-A. 
·0 
0 .. 0 * . -A 
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which denote, respectively, the first, second, third and fourth quadrant of 
blocks of matrices ~n the big matrix in (3.11). From (3.11) and (3.13), using 
the above notations, we get the Riccati equation 
p + P A + A P + Pf.P - u: = 0, 
{ 
. * 
(3.14 ) 
P(T) = 0 , 
for P. We also have 
(3.15 ) 
~vhere 
( n: + (P~ + IA *)rr + Pf 1 n:(T) = 0, - ~= 0 , 
The reader may compare the Riccati equation (3.14) from our dual approach 
with that in [9, (4.30)] obtained form the primal approach or that in [6, p. 312, 
(8.5.23)]. 
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~4. The Dual Max-Min Problem 
We study the dual problem in this section. This will become the basis of 
the finite element computations in §5. 
* 
N 
Henceforth, for simplicity, we denote the operators and Z CiCi 
N i=l 
* * L2 (induced by the matrices Ci(t)Ci(t) and Z Ci(t)Ci(t)) in as 
i=l n 
t i (l SiS N) and to' respectively. 
We will need several assumptions as we proceed. First, we assume 
(Al) each operator t. (1 SiS N) 
~ 
is strictly positive definite in 
From (3.6), we get 
(4.1) ,,~ -1 . ~" * x = -~. (p. + A p. - C z ). 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
By (Al), ~o is also strictly positive definite. By (3.9), we get 
{4.2) * C.z.) • 
~ ~ 
* CiCi 
We now substitute (4.1), (4.2), (3.7) and (3.10) into (3.3). Integrating by 
parts with respect to Po and Pi(l SiS N) once, using the end conditions 
(3.5) and (3.8) and simplifying, one obtains 
(4.3) 
10 
- z:: '11'i' 
i=l 
where 
N 
z:: 
i=l 
2 IIz.II ~ 2 
Lk i 
and p , S 
s 
are defined as in §3. 
We are now faced with the' problem of max minr.-(pO,pr:-tt 
Po p 
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N * L Ciz.> 
i=l ~ 
is easy to see that L(PO'p) is strictly concave in Po for any given p. 
However, for any given PO' L(PO'p) is not necessarily convex in p because 
of the negative sign in front of '11'3' To circumvent this, we will need the 
following import assumptiarr: 
(A2) The positive definite operators are large 
enough so that 
(4.4) 
for all Pi E H~n = {q/q,q E L!,q(T) = O}, for some vI > O. 
We remark that even if 1 ~ i ~ N, are not large enough, the above 
assumption can still be valid provided that T is chosen sufficiently small, 
because in this case, the first positive definite quadratic form in (4.4) will 
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2 have a larger coercivity coefficient to bound the L -norm, when the interval 
[O,T] is small. This agrees with the assumption that tl - to be sufficiently 
small in [9, p. 114, line 15]. 
Another special case wherein (A2) holds without requiring 
1 :: i :: N to be large ~s when 
_ B, for some B ~ O. 
It is easily seen that now 
(4.4) = 1 2 
2. * -1. * 1 r < p. + A p., t. (p. + a p.) >--2 ·2 < P , Bp > + < p ,Bp > i=l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s s s s 
1 2. * -1 * 
= 2 r < p. + A p.,It. (p. + A p.) > , i=l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
so (A2) holds. 
Remark 4.1 We believe that if (4.4) is not a positive semi-definite quadratic 
form, then J(x,u;X,v) is not convex in (x,u) (J is always concave in (X,v) for 
any given u), thus hindering the existence or uniqueness of the equilibrium 
strategy. This is still being investigated. 
Because the quadratic form (4.4) is symmetric, using the end condition 
Pi(T) = 0 (1:: i :: N) 
1 1 1 2 
p = (Pl,···,PN)' p 
and the Poincar~ inequality, we see that for 
= (P12, ••• ,PN2) E [Hl]N the bilinear form On ' 
(4.5) 1 2 1 N .1 * 1 -1.2 * 2 1 1 2 ~(p ,p ) == -2 ~ <Pi + A p., It i (Pi +A p;» - -=-<2 p ,Sp > i=l ~ • s s 
defines an equivalent inner product in [H~nJN. 
a 
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Lemma 4.2 Under (Al) and CA2) , for each given PO' L(PO'p) is strictly 
convex in P and for each given p, L(pO'P) is strictly concave in PO' 
Proof: For each given we can write as 
L(PO'P) = ~(p,p) + linear terms in p + constant terms (depending 
on Po and 
Since ~ forms an equivalent inner product in [H~n]N, we conclude that 
L(PO'P) is strictly convex in p. 
The second assertion is already clear. o 
For each given PO' L(PO'p) is strictly convex, continuous and coercive 
in p (1. e. , Therefore 
(4.6) 
is uniquely attained at p(PO)' depending on PO' 
From a straightforward variational analysis (or the Euler-Lagrange equations), 
we see that p(PO) satisfies 
(4.7) 
l!:i!:N, 
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-1 * where it is assumed that ti Ciz i (1 ~ i ~ N) are sufficiently smooth so that 
-1 * N iti (O)Ci (O)Zi(O)}l exist. 
New, consider L(PO) = L(PO'P(PO» as a functional of PO. It is easy 
to verify that L(PO) is concave with respect to PO. In fact, we have 
Lemma 4.3 L(PO) is strictly concave with respect to PO. 
Proof: For any e E [0,1] and any we have 
(4.8) 
where in the above, 1 1 e is chosen sufficiently small so that - 2 ~o + e I 
is still strictly negative definite. Continuing from (4.8), we get 
because che parenthesized term is concave and because 
negative definite. 
(continuing from the above) 
(4.9) > -
2 .2 * 2 2 + (1 - 8) min {L(po'P) + Ellpo + A poll }. 
E [HI ]N P On 
1 2 
If PO * Po and e * 0,1, then 
so (4.8) and (4.9) give 
- 1 - 2 
= eL(PO) + (1 - e)L(pO)' 
_ 1. r;-l + s1 
2 0 is 
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proving strict concavity. 0 
We proceed to study max L(pO). 
1 
POEHOn 
Lemma 4.4 Under (AI) and (A2) , L(PO) is (negatively) coercive with respect 
to PO' Le., 
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----_._-----
Proof: 1 N Because 0 E [HOn] , we have 
(4.10) 
1 -1(~ * ) N * 1 II 112 • * -1 N * 
-"2<11:0 £.C.z. , Z c.z.> +2 z - <PO+A Po,lI:o L: c.z.> 1 J J 1 J J i=l 1. 1. 
We use 
I<IQ,f>L2 / :;: ~llpdl~2 + 2:lIfll~2 :;: ¥<Po +A\O,II:~l(pO +A*PO» + ~Ifll~ 
n n n 
in (4.10); in the above the constant K> 0 depends on only. 
~ sufficiently small. One sees that 
1 2 1 2 1 IN * N ... + [~I II + Ilfll +( 1':1"- ,,... ) -~.. +.1, 12 zel Xo ~ Z; - )<"'0 \.L. l..~. ,L.v.~.> ",lz,1 J, 
I JJ IJJ ~ 
the right hand side tends to - "" as II POll -+ + "". 
HI 
On 
o 
Choose 
* C.z. 
1. 1 
The first main theorem 1n this section is 
Theorem 4.5 (Dual Saddle Point Theorem) Under (Al), (A2),the max-min 
problem max min L(PO'P) has a unique solution (PO,p). Furthermore, 
PO p 
(4.11) max min L(PO'p) = 
PoEH~n pE[H~n]N 
min max L(PO'p). 
pE[H~n]N poEH~n 
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Proof: We use the standard saddle point argument [5], except that we replace 
the compactness condition by coercivity. 
For each PO' there exists a unique p(PO) minimizing L(PO'p) with 
respect to p as in (4.6). 
minimizer PO. 
(4.12) 
Hence max min L(PO ,p) 
PO p 
has a unique solution (PO,p) (with 
max min L(PO'p) 
Po EH~n PE[H~n]N 
= min L(PO'p). 
pE[H~n]N 
For any Po E H~n' p E [H~n]N and e E (0,1), we have 
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-------------- -
In particular, we choose p = p( (1 - 8)pO + epO)' From the above we get 
Hence 
Noting that peel -e)po + epo) is continuous with respect to e, one lets e 
tend to 0+ and gets 
On the other hand, from (4.12), 
Therefore we conclude 
Hence (4.11) is proved. o 
So far, our derivation of the dual problem is only formal because we have 
not yet verified the assumptions in Theorem 2.1 that J(x,u,X,v) is convex 
in (x,u) and concave in (X,v) and that inf sup J(x,u,X,v) is attainable. 
These questions are answered in the following theorem. 
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Theorem 4.6 (Primal-Dual Equivalence Theorem) 
Assume that C.(t). z.(t). 1:: i::: N. f(t) 1. 1. 1 ~ i S N, are 
sufficiently smooth (as functions and operators, respectively). Under assumptions 
(Al) and (Al), for the linear quadratic differential game (0.1) and (3.1), let 
J(x,UjX,v) be defined as in (1.8). Then 
i) 
ii) 
(4.13 ) 
iii) 
(4.14 ) 
iv) 
(4.15 ) 
J(x,u;X,v) is convex in (x,u) and strictly concave in (X,v); 
" '" 
'" ,.. 
there exist unique (x,u) and (X,v) such that 
inf sup J(x,u;X,v) = 
(x,u) (X,v) 
feasible feasible 
" " A " 
= J(x,UjX,v) < 00 
min max J(x,UjX,v) = 
(x,u) (X,v) 
max 
(X,v) 
= min L(PO'p) 
PE[L~]N 
min max 
(x,u) (X,v) 
feasible feasible 
m1.n J(x,u;X,v) 
(x,u) 
J(x,u;X,v) 
min 
(x,u) 
x(O)=xO 
max L(pO'p;x,u;X,v). 
(X,v) 
= min 
(x,u) 
feasible 
X(O)=XO 
max J(x,u;X,v). 
(X,v) 
feasible 
v) The (second) dual of the (first) dual problem (namely, (D», obtained by regarding 
Pi - :£ Pi = 0 (1::: i ::: N) as constraints in L, recoveres to the primal 
problem (P). 
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Proof: The proof is based upon the "reflexivity" argument that "the dual 
of the dual is primal". 
By TIleorem 4.5, L(PO'p) attain its unique saddle point at (PO,p). 
In finding the saddle point of L(PO'p), we regard 
o ~ i ~ N , as constraints and introduce Lagrange multipliers AO' A=(A1, ... ,AN) 
and consider 
inf sup sup inf I(PO,PO,p,p;AO,A) 
A L2 A L2 N • . o n n PO,PO p,p 
PO(T)=O p(T)=O 
where 
(4.16 ) 
and L(pO'PO'p,p) is the same as that ~n (4.3) except that we now regard 
and • PO as unrelated. 
Define 
(4.17) l(AO,A) _ sup inf 
. • PO,PO P,P 
PO(T)=O p(T)=O 
We now apply (the proof of) Theorem 2.1 to L(po'p), subject to constraints 
Pi- ~t Pi = 0, Pi(T)=O, a ~ i ~ N. It is easy to see that all the assumptions 
of Theorem 2.1 are satisfied by L(PO'p), since by (A1) and (A2), L(PO'p) is 
strictly convex in p and strictly concave in PO. So we have a unique 
= min 
A eL2 0' n 
= min 
AO 
= 
max 
Po 
max 
A 
PO(T)=O 
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max min I(pO,PO,p,p;AO'A) 
• P,t> PO,PO 
PO(T)=O p(T)=O 
'" " min L(PO'p) = L(PO'p)· 
P 
p(T)=O 
On the other hand, from (4.16) and (4.17),by variational analysis on the 
• . bl h . 1 th '0 E Hn1, ' E [Hn1 J N PO' PO' p, P var1a es, we ave, necessar1 y, at ~ ~ 
and 
(4.18) -1 • * N * A - 11:0 (PO + A Po + r C. z.) = 0, 
o i=l J J 
(4.19) • [-1 • * N * N -1 * A - AtO (PO + A Po + E C. z.) - SCPO + ps ) + r B.M. B.p. + f] = 0, o j=l J J j=l J J J J 
(4.20) -1 • * * A. + ~1 (Pl· + A p. - C.z.) = 0 l 111 
(4.21) • -1 • * N * N -1 * A. +[ Ati (p; + A p. - r C.z.) + SCPO + P ) - r B.M. B.p. -
1. ... 1. j=l J J s j=l J J J J 
-1 * B.M. B.p. - f] = 0 
1. 1. 1. 1 , 
1 =: i :: N. 
In the above, PO' PO' p, P depend on AO' A. Now define n = (nl, •.. ,nN) 
-1 * 
- p.) 1 !: i !: N, (4.22 ) ~ - M. B. (PO + P 1. ~ S ~ 
-1 
* 1 (4.23 ) l;. ; -M. -B.p. :: i :: N. 
~ 1 l. 1 
From (3.12),(4.18), (4.19) and (4.22), we see that AO satisfies 
(4.24) -1 * B.M. B.p. + f 
J J J J 
N [ -1 * +p -p.)] = AAO + L B. M. B. (PO + f j=l J J J s J 
N 
= AAO + E B. n. + f. j=l J J 
Similarly, from (3.12), (4.20) - (4.23), we get 
(4.25 ) • A. = 
~ 
M .... L: 
~ 
B T). + B.l;. + f. 
J J ~ ~ 
The initial conditions satisfied by AO' A. (1 :: i :: N) 
~ 
are just 
(4.26) ,1::i::N. 
This can be easily verified (e.g., by comparing (4.18) with (4.7.4». 
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Substituting (4.18), (4.20), (4.22) and (4.23) into L(PO'p), we get 
this I(AO,T);A,l;) is just J(x,u;X,v) through identifying (AO,T),A,l;) with 
(x,UjX,v), subject to (4.24) - (4.26), i.e., subject to (1.10)=0 and 
(1.11)=0 (0:: i :: N) 
J(x,u;X,v) is convex ~n (x,u) and concave in (X,v) because 
J(x,u;X,v) = I(AO,n;A,~), which is the dual of L(PO'p) which is convex in 
Po and concave in p. The fact that J(x,u;X,v) is strictly concave in 
(X,v) for any given (x,u) can be verified directly from J itself. 
The min-max and max-min in (4.14) are exchangeable because of (4.11) 
in Theorem 4.5. 
o 
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Theorem 4.7 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Strategy for N-person 
Linear-Quadratic Differential Games) 
Assume that (Al) and (A2) hold. Then the unique saddle point 
of (4.14) satisfies the property that 
[ 0, T], where is the i-th component of 
,.. 
X. 
Thus 
,.. ,.. 
u = v and 
(4.27) J(~,~;X,;) = m1.n 
(x,u) 
max 
(X,v) 
J(x,u;X,v) = max 
(X,v) 
mln J(x,u;X,v) = 0, 
(x,u) 
so u is the unique equilibrium strategy for the N-person differential game. 
Proof: By (4.14), the saddle point property for J is uniquely satisfied 
by (~,~;X,;) , so we have 
Since the 
" v), we see 
(4.28) 
where a 
v. 
1 
min max 
(x,u) (X,v) 
feasible feasible 
RHS above is uniquely 
that v is uniquely 
" ,.. o J(x,u;X,v) 
v. 
1 
,.. 
v=v 
J(x,UjX,v) = max J(i,;;;X,v). 
(X,v) 
attained by <X,~) (X depends on both 
characterized by 
= 
i ~ A A A 
-0 J.(x ,ul,.··,u. l'v.,u. 1' ... U..) v. 1 1- 1 1+ N 
1 
denotes the Fr~chet derivative with respect to v .• 1. 
Similarly, we have 
min 
(x,u) 
max J(x,u;X,v) 
(X,v) 
= min J(x,uiX(u,~),v) 
(x,u) 
"-
u and 
,.. 
v.=v. 
1 1 
where in the RHS above -1,.. -N,.. = (x (u,v), ... ,x (u,v» depends on u and ,.. v 
as follows: 
.. 
-1 
X = Aii+ B.u. + B.v. + f J J 1. 1. 
= 0, 
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" Thus u is uniquely characterized by 
- " " 
N 
(4.29) a J(x,u;X(u,v),v) = 
u. ( 
-j " E a J.(x,u, ... ,u..) - J.(x (u,v),ul,···,u. l' j=l ui J N J J-1 
..... 
= 0 at u = u, for i = 1, .•. ,N. 
Therefore (4.29) gives 
(4.30 ) 
where 
"i - Ai "" "" a J(x,u ;X(u ,v),v) 
u. 
1 '" u.=u. 
1 1 
= 0, 
"'1 
U = (~l""'~' l'u.,~. l""'~N)' 1- 1 1+ 
But, evaluating the RHS of (4.29) with "'i u = u , at 
for i=l, ... ,N. 
..... 
u. = u., we find that 
1 1 
A _j Ai A A A A A A 
a [J (x U'" u" u u'" u ) - J.(x (u ,v),ul,···u. l'u.,u. l'···.u. l'V' u. j • 1"" i-I' i' i+l"'" N J 1- 1 1+ J- J 
1 
if j f i. 
So (4.30) is reduced to 
--------------------- - --
, a ( (..... " '" " ) l4.31) J. x,ul ,·· .u. l'u. ,u'+l '" ,uN u. J 1- 1 1 
1 
( -J ("1....." " "''' " :11 
- J 1· xu, v) • ul ' ... , u. 1'v " u. 1"'" u )J 1- 1 1+ N U. 
1 
= (" " " " ) a J. x,u., ... ,u. l'u.,u. 1,···uN u. 1 1 1- 1 1+ " 
1 u.=u. 
0, 
1 1 
because the second term in the above bracket is just a constant. 
Comparing (4.28) with (4.31), we see that " U. 
1 
and " Vi' i = l, ... ,N, 
satisfy the very same equations, whose solutions are unique. Hence u = v 
is proved. 
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A A Ai A Because u = v, we conclude immediately that x = x,~·i = 1, ... ,N and 
that the saddle point value (4.27) is O. '" So u is an equilibrium strategy. 
non zero-sum linear quadratic differential game is, indeed, a 2N-person zero-
sum game, with N authentic players represented by ui ' 1 !: i !: N I and N 
fictitious players represented by 1 !: i !: N. 
Remark 4.9 
(4.32) 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
If, at the outset, we consider 
min max { J(x,u;X,v) 
(x,u) (X,v) 
(4.33), (4.34) below}. 
B.u. + f 
~ ~ 
on {:(:)~ :o.~ 
{::(:)~ix; B.u. + B.v. + f J J ~ ~ 
[ 0,1] , 
on [0, T] , 
1 < i < N 
= = 
Note that in (4.34.2), (1 ~ i ~ N) need not be equal 
Then using duality, we will arrive at the same L(PO'p) as 
except that 
'11'S is now replaced by 
N 
< Pi (0) ,x~ 'IrS - -<PO(O),xO >- 1: >. i=l 
to Xo in (4.33.2). 
given in (4.3) , 
D 
D 
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Since the validity of assumptions (AI) and (A2) is not affected by ~I, we see 
8 
that all the theorems in this section, except Corollary 4.7, remain valid for 
problem (4.32). The result '" '" u = v still holds for problem (4.32). But, now 
in general, so the saddle point value of (4.32) is not equal to 0 in 
general. 
Remark 4.10 For linear-quadratic N-person games, under (AI) and (A2), the 
Hamiltonian (1.18) and the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equation must be at a 
saddle point (instead of just min-max) for all t or T E [O,T]. 
o 
o 
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§5 Global Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions forthe Riccati Equation 
The system of Riccati equations [8,(4.30)] in Lukes and Russell's 
approach has been known to have only local existence and uniqueness of 
solutions. However, under our approach, we can prove that our Riccati equation 
has global existence and uniqueness of solutions. The proof is an extension 
of the control theory case, cf. e.g. [12, pp.l97-20S], to our equation. 
Theorem 5.1 Under assumptions (Al) and (A2), the Riccati equation 
(5.1) {
:Ii? + lP A 
lP (T) = 0 
* + A lP + lPSlP - a: = 0 on [O,T], 
as given in (3.14) has a unique solution lP on [O,T]. 
Proof: Define 
subject to 
(5.2) 
and 
subject to 
(5.3) 
tl 
_; [ICi (t)x(t)1 2 
to 
N 
+ < }1. (t)u. (t) , u. (t) > ] d t, 
~ ~ ~ 
d dt x(t) = A(t)x(t) + r B. (t) u. (t) 
i=l ~ ~ 
+ (M. (t)v. (t) ,v. (t»]dt, 
1. 1. 1. 
d i . de x (t) = A(t)x1.(t) + r B.(t)u.(t) + B.(t)v.(t) j;i J J 1. 1. 
~. , 1. 
l<l.<K 
1 < i < N. 
= 
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Further, let 
(5.4) 
subject to (5.2) and (5.3). 
Lemma 5.2 Assume (Al) , (A2) • Let '" "" X A (-x,u: ,v) satisfy (5.2) and (5.3) with t = 0 
tl = T, t;o = t;l = = t;N = x O· Let qo' ql' ••. , qN be the solution on [O,T] 
* 
N 
. 
" qO(T) (5.5) qo = -A q + I: !c. x , = 0, 0 i=l 1. 
. 
* "1. q. (T) (5.6) q. = -A q. - !C.x = 0, 1 < 1. < N. 
1. 1. 1. 1. = = 
Then (~,~;X,~) is the unique saddle p01.nt for m1.n max J(x,u;X,v,xO,XO;O,T) 
(x,u) (X,V) 
if and only if 
(5.7) " -1 * u. = M. B. (qo + .E q. ) 1 < 1. < N 
1. 1. 1. J = = Hi 
" -1 * 1 i ~ v. = - M. B.q. < N. 1. 1. 1. 1. (5.8) 
0, 
of 
Proof of Lemma 5.2 By Theorem 4.7, min max J(x,u;X,v;xO,XO;O,T) has a unique 
(x,u) (X,v) 
saddle point. If (x,~;X,v) is this saddle point, it loS characterized by 
(5.9) 
(5.10 ) 
where (~,~) and (X,v) and X 1- (-1 -2 -N) \:: x ,x , ... ,x 
(5.11 ) 
{ 
~ = Ai 
i(O) = 
+ L B.ii. 
1. 1. 
1. 
0, 
on [O,T], 
VE E lR, 
VE E lR, 
satisfy 
45 
E B.ll. + B.v. 
• ..t. J J ~ ~ JT~ 
on [0, TI 
(5.12) 
1 ~ i ~ N. 
xi .. Aii + E B . 'ti' . 
ji:i J J 
on (0, T] J 
(5.13) 
1 ~ i ~ N. 
" -Note that in the RHS of (5.9) X +€X appears because it is also dependent on 
" -u + e:u. 
From (5.9), we get 
which is 
(5.14) 2 
N 
E 
i=l 
T 
J [<c. (t)x(t) ,C. (t)x(th + <H. (t)u. (t) ,ii. (t» o 1 1 1 1 1 
From (5.5), (S.6), (S.ll), (S.12) and (S.13), we have 
-~ o = <x(T) ,qO(T» + E <x (T) ,q. (T» 
• 1 
T 
= f 
o 
~ 
[<A(t)x(t) + E 
i 
Bi(t)Ui(t),qO(t»+<X(t),-A*(t)qO(t) + ~ G:i(t)i(t) > 
~ 
-i -i * i +E < A(t)x (t) + L B.(t)u.(t),q.(t»+ E <x (t),-A (t)q.(t) - a:i(t)x (t»]dt 
i ji:i J J 1 i ~ 
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(5.15) 
T 
+ 1: f [-<M.(t)~.(t),u.(th + <B~(t)qO(t),u.(th + 1: <B~(t)q.(t),u.(thJ dt. i 0 L L L L L j~i L J L 
Comparing (5.1S) with (S.14), we see that (S.9) holds if and only if 
T 
J [-<M.(t)u.(t),~.(t» +<B~(t)qO(t),u.(t» + 1: <B~(t)q.(t),u.(t»]dt ::: 0 o 1. 1. L 1 1 'J' 1 J 1 
J71. 
for all u. E U. , i ::: 1,2, ..• ,N. This gives 
1. 1 
'" * i -M.u. + BiqO + 1: B.q. = 0, 1 ~ ~ N, 1 1 jri 1 J 
which are just (S.7). 
We can obtain (5.8) in a similar manner. The proof of Lemma 5.2 is complete. 
The proof of Lemma 5.2 indicates that with appropriate simple adaptation, the 
arguments given in [12,pp.197-205] are immediately applicable to our proof. As in 
[12,p.199,(2.l6)], analogously, we now claim that we have 
N . 
(5.16) qO(T)x(T) + E q.(T)x1(T)::: min max J(x,u;X,V;X(T),X(T);T,T), 
i=l 1 (x,u) (X,v) 
where A ,.. "" '" (x,u:X,v) solves the min-max problem, on the RHS above with (arbitrary) 
l.nitial condition (i(T),X(T» for (x,X) at the beginning time T. 
, 
Because f and ~ 1n (3.14) are 0, the solution y of (3.14) is also 0 on 
[O,T}. Thus, by (3.12), 
(S .17) 
f qo (t)] 
lq(t) 
= [ 
~(t)l 
lP(t) ,. 
X(t) 
t E [0, T] , if lP exis ts • 
From (S.16) and (5 • 17), we ge t 
TE [0, 
(5.18) (
X(T )1 
< lP(T) '" 
X(T) , [~(T) 1 >X(T) = min max J(x,u;X,V;X(T),X(T);T,T), (x,u) (x,v) 
whenever lP exists on [T,T}. 
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The nonlinearity in,the Riccati equation (3.13) satisfies the local 
Lipschitz condition. So, by the Picard local existence and uniqueness theorem, 
the solution lP (t) of (3.14) exists at least on a half open interval (-r',T], 
for some -r'<T. Assume the contrary that lP does not exist globally on (0, T]. 
Then there is at least one -r' E CO,T) such that 
lim ! !P(t)!! = ~ • 
t-r-r' 
This means that there exists at least one such 
that 
(S .19) xo xo 
1 1 
xo xo 
lim ! < lP (t) > ! = ~ . 
t-r-r ' 
(S.19) 
N N 
xo Xo 
But, if we choose ~n (S.2), (S.3) and 
apply (S.18) and Remark 4.8, we see that 
lim < ]pet) 
t-r-r ' 
> = min max J(x,u;X,v;xo,(x~, ••• ,x~);-r' ,T) 
(x,u)(X,u) 
= a finite number, 
contradicting (S.19). 
Therefore lP exists uniquely on [0, T1. 
a 
§6. The Dual Variational Problem and Finite Element Approximations 
Let F: Hl x H2 + lR be a real-valued Frechet differentiable mapping from 
a product Hilbert space HI x H2 into lR. Assume that F(x,y) is strictly 
convex in x (for each y) and strictly concave in y (for each x), and that 
(x,y) is the unique saddle point of F satisfying 
F(x,y) min F(x,y). 
jeEHl 
Then it can be easily shown that (i,y) is uniquely characterized by 
(6.1) a F(X,yA) I A = 0 
X x=x 
(6.2) a F(x,y)1 '" = 0. y y=y 
We now apply the above property to L(PO'p). It is easy to see from the 
theory in §4 that all of the assumptions above are satisfied. Therefore 
(po,p), the unique solution of max min L(PO'p) 
PO p 
characterized by 
From (4.3), by a simple calculation, we get 
(6.3) 
. * -1 N * 
-<r +A r,itO E C.z-.> -<r,f> -<reO) ,xo> = 1 ~ ~ 
(6.4) 
~s 
1 
0, 'rJr E HOn' 
The above two relations induce a bilinear form on H01n x [HI ]N. On • for 
(6.5) [
rl1 [r21 .1 * 1 -1.2 * 2 
a( slJ J s2J ) - --<r +A r ,a:O (r +A r» 
N .1 * 1 -1.2 * 2 1 N 1 N 2 
+Z<s.t.+A s.,a: (si+Asi»-<r + Z s.,S Z S.> 
1" ~ i j=l J j=l J 
1 N 1 N -1 * 2 N 2 N -1 * 1 
+ <r + Z si' L.: B.Mi BiS.> + < L.: S., L.: B.M. BiSi > i=1 i=1 ~ ~ i=I ~ i=l ~ ~ , 
and a linear form 9: for r E HI On 
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1 
r , 
(6.6) 9( [:] ) 
N N * -1 N * 
;: <r +Z Sj ,f> + <reO) + Z s. (0) ,xo> + <r +A r,iCo Z CiZi > 1 1 J 1 
Thus (6.3) and (6.4) are equivalent to 
(6.7) [] ) = 9( []) , 
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We are now in a position to compute (PO,p) by the finite element method. 
2 ~ As in [1], we say that Sh C He (O,T) is a (tl ,t2)-system (tl ,t2 are non- , 
negative integers) if for all there exists 
------------ -----------------
(6.8) 
where ~ = min(tl -Yj,k -Yj) and K > a is independent of hand v. 
Let 
(6.9) 
Sh c. HI On be a (~,l)-system. 
max min L(PO'p). 
POESh PE[Sh]N 
We consider 
such that 
It is easy to see that under (AI), (A2) , there exists a unique saddle point 
L(POh'Ph) = max 
POESh 
This point (POh'Ph) is characterized as the solution to the variational 
equation 
(6.10) 
are basis for Sh' N [Sh] , respectively, then 
(6.~O) is a matrix equation MbYh = eh , where 
[~lij = a{::] . [:~] ) 
= e{::] ) 
MOre specifically, 
o i * i -l.d * .1 
<'It + A 'It ,!CO (r + A r) > 
1 :: i, j :: (N+1)J, 
1 <· 
- J :: (N+1)Jo 
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I 
I 
IN.. . N ~* i I ~ J -
-r < ~ <Pk'S~> + ~'Jr , ~ Bk~ k<Pk> 
I k=l k=l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
----------------------------------r------------------------------------
e = h 
N 0 i * i -1 oj * j k~l <<Pk +A <P ,IC i (<Pk +A <Pk» -
N N 
- < z: Q i ,S.z <P~> 
k=l k k=l 
Note that ~ is symmetric but non-positive definite. 
1 
J 
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--------------- -
Numerical analysis for general quadratic saddle point problems seems to be 
difficult. To make the above computatIons amenable to standard finite element 
error analysis, .once again, we need two more assumptions:-
(A3) the bilinear form a satisfies 
inf sup laC [:~J · [::} I > 0; [:: In= u[:: }= " 1 1 
and 
(A4) the spaces {Sh}h satisfy 
la( [:; ] [:n I inf sup ) I - Yh > Y > 0, {:UH [:;]H I I 
" for some y > O,'-fh > o. 
----- ------ ---- --- -- - -- --
The fact that the above two assumptions are realistic can be seen from 
the following 
Proposition 6.1 If ~-l ; 0 1 III. , ... = , , ... ,N, 
~ as positive definite operators, are 
comparatively larger than S and 
are valid. ' 
-1 * B.M. B., ~ = 1, ••• ,N, 
~ ~ ~ 
Proof For any given (r2,s2) E H~n x [H~n]N 
have 
(6.11) 
sup 
I/[:~] 1/- 1 
then (A3) and (A4) 
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[ .2 2 -1.2 2 N.2 2 -1(.2 2) 2 2] :! <r + A*r ,U::O (r +A*r» + L <s1 +A*s1'ti stA*si > + <r ,Sr > 1 
If (i = 0, ••• ,N) are large enough, the second bracketed term above can 
be at most equal to a fraction of the first bracketed term, thus for some 
\.: 0 < \. < 1, 
sup 
II [:~] II = 1 
a( [:~J · [::J )1 0 ,' the first bracketed term in (6.11) 
~ y > 0, for some y. 
Therefore 
Hence (AJ) and (A4) are justifiable under the assumption. In fact, the above 
argument shows that assumptions (AJ) and (A4) are related to the earlier 
assumption (A2). 
Theorem 6.2 Let (POh,Ph) be the solution of (6.9) and let Sh be a 
(~,l)-system. Assume that Ci(t),zi(t), i = 1, •.• ,N are sufficiently smooth. 
Under (Al)-(A4), we have 
o 
S4 
(6.12) 
(6.13 ) 
provided A Ale 1 e N (po'p) E [HO n H ] x [HO n H ] , where ~ = min (~-l,e-l) n n n n and 
Ki > 0 is a constant independent of (PO,p), Consequently, 
(6.14 ) 
holds for some K2 > 0 independent of (po,p). 
Proof: Because (POh'Ph) satisfies (6.10) and (PO,p) satisfies (6.7), we get 
Therefore ([l,p. 186]) by (A3) and (A4), one gets 
for some C > 0 independent of h. 
Using (6.8), we get (6~12). 
To prove (6.13), we use Nitsche's trick ([4], (10]). By (A3) and [1], for any 
ha i ( ) E IJoln x [Hlan]N we ve a un que w g ~ such that 
--------- - -
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--------- ----
~y E HlOn x [Hlon]N. a(w(g),y) = <g,y> 2 2 N' v 
Ln x [Ln] 
-------------
Furthermore, we have w(g) E [HlO n H2] x [Hl n H2]N 
n n On n' provided that Ci(t) 
and zi(t), i = 1,2, ••• ,N, are sufficiently smooth. (This w(g) can be 
obtained explicitly from integration by parts and it satisfies an equation 
similar to (4.7». It is not difficult to verify that 
I/w(g)l/? 2 N == K'I/g/l 2 2 N ' 
H- x [H ] L x [L ] 
n n n n 
where K' is independent of g. By the very same proof of the Aubin-Nitsche 
lemma [4, p. 137], which remains valid under (A3) and (A4), we get 
(6.15 ) 
But, by (6.8), 
"w(g) - ~h/l == b . K""h/lw(g)/1 2 
IIglI H 
n 
== /I~II • K"' • h • K'I/gl/ = K'K""h, for some K"" > 0 independent of g and w(g). 
Using the above in (6.15), we get (6.13). 
To show (6.14), we note that 
[
'" A 
POh - Po 
) - 9( ,. ",j 
P - P h 
) . 
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) ] 
The first term on the right above is zero because of (6.1). The second term 
on the right can be estimated by using (6.12). Hence we get (6.14). 0 
Corollary 6.3 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
(6.18) 
(6.19) 
and 
Then 
(6.20) 
Let 
,. -1 :.. '" N 
xh - Co (rOh + A*POh + Z C~z.) i=l 1. 1. 
i = 1,2, ••• ,N, 
i=1,2, .•• ,N, 
i=1,2, ••• ,N, 
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(6.21) 
for some K3 > 0 independent of i, U, ~, v, Po and p. o 
The convergence rate (6.20) is the sharpest possible [101. The rate (6.21) 
is not optimal. To obtain a faster rate of convergence for x and X, one can 
use -Uh and vh in (DE) = 0 and (DE)i = 0 (1 ~ i ~ N) to solve for more 
accurate x and X. 
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§7. Examples and Computational Results 
In this section, we apply the finite element method to some examples and 
present our numerical results. 
Example 1 We consider the following two person no'n zero-sum game 
{
X(t) ::ox(t) 
x(O) ::0 0 
T 
= f [Ix(t) 
o 
, t E [O,T] , T = rr/4, 
The Lagrangian L in (4.3) corresponding to this problem is 
(7.1) 
1 1 1 1 - --------
- <PO +Pl +P2,l> - '2 < '2[(cos t + '2) + sin t], (cos t + '2) + sin t> 
1 ' 1 1 
+ '2r<cos t + 2' cos t +? + <sin t, sin t> ]. 
. -1 1 -1 -1 -1 * -1 * ---US-l;~-mo- = '2 ' «:1 = 1,-«:2. .. 1, BiMi BI ~ 2, B2M2 B2 = 2, S = 4, we- easily 
verify that (AI) - (A4) are all satisfied for all T > O. 
We choose a (4,1)-system of Hermite cubic splines as in [13. p .56]. The interval 
[O,T] is divided into N equal subintervals, each with mesh length h = i. The matrix 
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~ is a (6N ... 3) x (6N t3) matrix. We use the IMSL high accuracy subroutine LEQ2S 
to solve the matrix equation &Y-h = -Sh on an IBM370/M d 1 3033 -n a e at the Pennsylvania 
State University. 
Numerical results are plotted in Figures 1 - 4: 
(i) Figure 1: Strategy ul is plotted, using h = */16, f/32, f/64, respectively. 
Numerical results for v l are found to be identical with ul' as indicated 
in Theorem 4.7. 
(ii) Figure 2: Strategy u2 is plotted, using h = */16, *132, */64, respectively. 
Numerical results for 
(iii) Figure 3: State x is 
(iv) Figure 4: 1 x, x and 
v2 are identical with u2 • 
plotted, using h = */16, *132, 
2 
x are plotted, with h = */16. 
*/64. 
Except near t = 0 
and t = T (where all three trajectories exhibit a great deal of roughness), 
1 2 the numerical data of x, x and x differ very little. 
The values of L(PO,Pl,P2) and J(x,u;X,v) are found to be 
L = J = 0.02394619 h = 1I/16 4 
(7.2) L = J = 0.01211985 h = 1I132 4 
L = J = 0.00609733 , h = */64. 
A quick observation points out that L converges to 0 with rate (?(h 1). This 
seems to contradict (6.14), which predicts that the rate should be ~(h6). 
Nevertheless, we believe that this is not really paradoxical because, first 
of all, ~(h6) is a quite high rate of convergence, which is hard to verify 
and, secondly, we believe that the values of Land J in (7.2) are probably 
composed of quadrature and round off errors, since our h is very small and 
the matrix solver has high accuracy. All of our calculations were carried 
out with double precision. 
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In Table I, we list some values of u 1 2 l' u2 , x, x , x , PO' PI 
and P2 at'certain selected nodal points. 
Example 2 We compute Example 1 again, but with T = 2TI and h = 2TI/16. 
The graphs for u1 and u2 are plotted in Figure 5. Here again we have 
in numerical values. 1 2 The graphs for x, x and x are 
plotted in Figure 6. The reader may compare them with the pictures of 
Example 1. 
Example 3 We consider the following 2-person non-zero sum game: 
{
X(t) = x(t) + cos t • u1 (t) + sin t . u 2 (t) + 1, 
x(O) = 0, 
T 1 2 1 2 
Jl(x,u): f [Ix(t) - dl(cos t + 2) I + 3 ul(t)]dt, 
o 
T 
Jz(x,u): f [!x(t) - dZ o 
sin 2 1 2 tl + 2 u2(t)]dt, 
o :: t :: T, 
It is not clear to us whether conditions (A2) - (A4) ~re satisfied when 
T is large. 
For 
L = 0.02394619 
L = 0.01211985 
L = 0.00609733 
T = ! 4 , we find that 
, h = */16 
h = JJ./32 4 
h = */64. 
Surprisingly, they agree identically with the values in (7.2) (except 
the last few digits which have been rounded off by us). 
For T = 2TI. (d1,d2) = (-1, 0.9), we find that 
L = -0.02630621, h = 2TI/4 
L = 
-0.03772221, h = 2Tr/8 
L = -0.0412112 i , h = 2Tr/16 
L = -0.04456356, h ;; 2Tr/32 
L = -0.05005449, h = 2Tr /64 
· \ 
These values of L are all negative and seem to be divergent. See [3, §4, 
Example 3] for further discussions. 
61 
a 
Due to the lack of any known closed form solutions to make comparisons, 
error estimates (6.20) and (6.21) can not be verified at this stage. However, 
in Part II [3] of our papers, numerical results for Example 1 will be compared 
with those obtained from another very different approach - the penalty method. 
They manifest remarkable agreement. This gives a good indication that our 
treatment and calculations are sound. 
Note added in proof: We have recently improved the order of convergence of 
L to @(h5), which is close to the predicted rate @(h6) mentioned at the last 
paragraph of page 59. In addition, the roughness of the state x as well as xl 
and x2 as shown in Figures 3, 4, and 6, and those in certain figures in Part II 
of our papers, have all been eliminated. ~he improved numerical results will be 
published later on in a technical journal. 
u1 
u2 
x 
1 
x 
x2 
Po 
PI 
P2 
1 n 1 n 
t = ~ . t = - • 4' t = - • '4 n =! = T 4 2 4 4' t 4 
h= 1!./16 h= 1!./32 h= 1!./64 h= !/16 n h= !/64 h= !/16 n n n n n h= -/32 h= -/32 h= -/64 h= -/16 h= -/32 h= -/6[' 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
-2.022507 -2.050318 -2.064450 -1.199239 -1.219113 -1.229223 -0.536199 -0.549396 -0.556116 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.421594 0.431190 0.436094 0.271250 0.278159 0.281693 0.123312 0.127565 0.129746 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.131033 -0.127947 -0.126924 -0.138533 -0.137644 -0.13 7191 -0.053930 -0.053681 -0.053709 -0.25000 -0.250000 -0.25000C 
-0.145114 -0.134294 -0.130115 -0.153802 -0.145366 -0.141075 -0.073320 -0.063079 -0.058435 -1.207107 -1.207107 -1.207101 
-0.116951 -0.121600 -0.123733 -0.123263 -0.129922 -0.133308 -0.034540 -0.044283 -0.048983 0.707107 0.707107 0.707101 
0.589659 -0.593969 -0.596131 -0.328370 -0.331397 -0.332918 -0.144788 -0.147134 -0.148312 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.011253 1.025159 1.032225 0.599620 0.609556 0.614612 0.268099 0.274698 0.278058 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.421594 -0.431190 -0.436094 0.271250 -0.278159 -0.281694 -0.123312 -0.127565 -0.129746 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Remark: The numerical values of VI' v2 are identical, respectively, with u1 , u2 • All entries above are rounded 
off figures with six decimal place accuracy. 
Table 1: Numerical Values of u1 , u2 , x, xl, x
2
, PO' PI and P2 at t = -4
1 
.! !.! l. ~ and ~ 4 '2 4' 4 4' 4. 
1 
! 
! 
,. . 
U1 
e-
-t-
-2-
-3- -:1'" 
~~ 
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--------
.-------
I I Iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii Iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii iii 
'2) e e 1 '2) 2 e 3 e 4 a 5 e 6 e 7 
TIME 
LEGEND 
----- 2 -------. 3 
Figure 1: Duality Solution of u1 ' Example 1 
U2 
LEGEND 
----- 2 
-------. 3 
Figure 2: Duality Solution of u2 , Example 1 
• I 
II 
... 
] 'f.;' 0~1rv-~77------------____________________________ ------~~ 
S ~ 1/ ~ T J: 
A II/ ~ -1~1 
1 
1 
-2~ 11~I~i~i~i~i~i~i~i ~irlririririrlririTiTiil~i~i~i~i~i~i~i~i~i~lri~i~i~i~1 ~i~lrlrirlririrlriTITi·riTi~'11~i~i"~I~i~l~i~i~i~lrri ~iririririrTi ~ Iii I I Iii i i 
e e e 1 e 2 e 3 e 4 e 5 e 6 e 7 
TIME 
LEGEND 
----- 2 
-------. 3 
Figure 3: Duality Solution of x, Example 1 
Throughout Figures 1, 2 and 3, curves 1, 2, and 3 represent the 
numerical solutions with h = ~/16, ~/32 and ~/64, respectively, 
for Example 1. 
04 
. . . 
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" 
", :x 
0~ ~r'~~------------------------------------------------------~~'~~"1: \I IX 
, I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
-1- : 
I 
I 
I 
I 1 
IX 
I 
I 
-2- I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-3": I ~~I~Mn~~~~~Tr~~~TrI~~~TrMM~~~I~~~~~~~~I~~~TT 
a.a 13.1 e 2 13 3 13.4 13 5 13 6 13 7 
TIME 
Figure 4: 1 2 Duality Solutions of X, X and X , Example 1, 
with h = f/16. 
S 
T 
A 
T 
-2-
I 
8 
-8.5 
E -1.8 
-I 5 
Figure 
8 
Fisure 
I 
1 2 
5: The Case 
Example 2, 
2 
6: The Case 
Example 2, 
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I I I 
3 4 5 6 
TIME 
T = 2n, Strategies ul and u2 ' 
with h = 2n/16. 
3 4 5 6 
TIME 
T = 2n, State x, 1 and 2 x x , 
with h = 2n/16. 
--~-- ---- ~ -----.....- -~. -- -'-
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